

DIFFERENCES AMONG PHILIPPINE PEASANTS: A PROVINCIAL SAMPLE

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Common to many studies are characteristics that supposedly help to differentiate the peasantry: land tenure and income. Using data from a 1971 survey of Nueva Ecija, villagers' tenure and per capita income statuses were compared against four sets of variables: (a) background, (b) living conditions, (c) livelihood and economic conditions, and (d) attitudes. Considering certain limitations of the survey as well as the difference in the original purposes of the study from those for which the data were used, the investigation confirmed that village society is too intricate to be stratified on the basis of land tenure and measures of income. Had information on the quality of peasants' personal relationships and on the area's history been present: (a) some explanation as to why and how complexity exists in village society and (b) some criteria for differentiating the peasantry other than land tenure and income might have been discovered.

Introduction and Purpose

This paper tries to identify types of peasants.¹ While we appreciate the debate about defining peasants, we agree with Henry Landsberger that the "problem of distinguishing between peasants, that is within the peasantry" is more important "than the problem of 'delimiting' the peasantry" (1973:13). To justify our attempt to distinguish among villagers in one Philippine province, we need to consider how the problem is relevant to other issues in peasant studies.

The literature indicates at least two important reasons for differentiating among peasants. First, peasants' political actions vary with their type. This claim, while possibly true for many behaviors, is most discussed for studies of peasant-based political parties, organizations, rebellions, and revolts. D.N. Aidit of Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh in Viet Nam, and Amado Guerrero of the Philippines, among other Southeast Asian revolutionaries, have written that "poor peasants" and "middle peasants" are more likely to support and then join revolutionary organizations than "rich peasants" (Aidit, 1967:254-260; Guerrero, 1971). Mao Tse-tung's writings are among the better known on this point. Beginning in the 1920s with a view that rural society was simply dichotomized

between landlords and tenants, Mao and others in the Communist Party learned through research and organizational experience that China had at least three kinds of peasants. Rich peasants, who were least inclined to revolt, usually owned some or all the land they worked, but they "exploited" other villagers by hiring them at low wages and made profits from usury. Middle class peasants owned or rented land. Unlike rich peasants, they depended only on their own family's labor to make a living and are among those the rich peasants and landlords exploit. Poor peasants, having no land of their own, had to rent lands from others, had inadequate farm implements, and, in order to scratch out a living, took low paying and temporary jobs (Huang, 1975a: 132-160; 1975b:271-296; Schram, 1963:172-177; Hinton, 1966:623-626). Poor peasants, according to Mao, were the most apt to revolt.

Not only revolutionaries have taken note of differences within the peasantry. Underlying many governments' agrarian reform programs is the notion that certain kinds of peasants are induced to organize and even revolt while other kinds are not. Justifications for land reform efforts since the 1930s in the Philippines, for example, have equated share tenancy with rural turmoil but small landowners with tranquility.

A second reason to notice difference among peasants, according to students of rural society, is that different types of peasants are associated with particular political-economic conditions

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and/or degrees of "modernization." Hamza Alavi divides peasants into three "sectors" — rich, middle, and poor — that, he argues, are not arranged hierarchically "one over the other, in a single order. . ." but rather are distinguishable because each belongs to "a different sector of the rural economy" (1965:244). Similarly, Arthur Stinchcombe classifies peasants according to the type of "agricultural enterprise" (e.g., plantation, hacienda, small family holding) they work on (1961:165-176). Jeffrey Paige (1975) modifying Stinchcombe's, distinguishes rural people according to their principal source of income (land or wages) and their relationships to non-farmers in the countryside. He then correlates each type with particular political actions.

Some writers have argued that the degree to which a society has one kind of peasant rather than another, and indeed, the extent to which peasants differ at all, indicate the extent of modernization. For example, Lenin wrote that the expansion of capitalism into the countryside of Russia in the late 19th century was a "powerful progressive factor" partially because it was disintegrating the peasantry (1966: 15-22; 29-33). Initially, Lenin argued, capitalism creates different types of peasants — some with land and others without. Ultimately, it eliminates those peasants in the "middle," forcing rural people into one of two new classes: "rural bourgeoisie," the minority who thrive in capitalism; and the "rural proletariat," the majority who eke out a living, usually as day laborers and unskilled workers, and are completely landless. Without being Leninists, others (Migdal, 1974) have developed the idea that a more or less homogeneous peasantry becomes heterogeneous as those political and economic conditions usually associated with modernization envelope Third World countries. Eventually, some authors (Piker, 1975: 298-323; Lopreato, 1967) claim, peasants will disappear altogether. Those rural folks who were previously peasants will become "post-peasant" agricultural workers, entrepreneurs, and urban immigrants.²

Getting consistent results when using these schemes is more difficult than describing them. For instance, Alavi and Eric Wolf (1969: 276-302) seem to agree that the Chinese Communist Party correctly differentiated the types of peasants but argue that its predictions were erroneous. Middle peasants, not poor peasants, are initially the most militant, not only in China but in other places. Poor peasants only get active later. On the other hand, Paige (1975: 26-40) argues that landownership, which for Wolf, Alavi, and Mao is generally characteristic of middle peasants, makes them conservative. He found that the stronger their tie to land and the greater the importance of land to their income, the greater the peasant's resistance to revolutionary political movements. Meanwhile, a study of fascism in rural Italy found that poor sharecroppers, whose "psychology was close to that of a small proprietor" ("middle" or "poor" peasants in Alavi, Wolf, and Mao's terms?) were most inclined to support fascism as a counter to socialist-oriented organizations whose rural supporters were mainly day laborers on commercial farms in the same area (Snowden, 1972: 276). These sharecroppers had a niche, however small, in the rural society that the organized agricultural workers threatened. Similarly, in Oaxaca, Mexico, extremely poor peasants — this time farming communal lands — were not only apathetic towards the revolution in neighboring Morelos state, but were "apprehensive of it because of the risks it entailed" (Waterbury, 1975: 439). And for the Philippines, a study (Kerkvliet, 1977) found that share tenants were the backbone of the Huk rebellion from the beginning. If these share tenants were "poor peasants," their case would fit Mao's theory, but it would not mesh with Alavi and Wolf's conclusions, and depending on one's interpretations of some of Paige's slippery language,³ it may not jibe with his expectations either.

Our paper will not attempt to resolve these difficulties. We have referred to them, however, to show the relevance of our analysis. Common

to many studies illustrated by those cited above are two characteristics that supposedly help to differentiate the peasantry: land tenure (e.g., whether a person is a landowner, tenant farmer, or agricultural worker) and income. While not sufficient criteria for any of the known ways to typologize peasants, they are necessary to most. Having access to reliable survey data on Filipino villagers in one rice-producing area, we wondered whether we could distinguish among them according to tenure, income and combinations of both. We also believed the inquiry was justifiable because few studies of Southeast Asian villagers have tried to identify these differences.

Data from Nueva Ecija in the Philippines

In 1971, staff members of the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC) randomly selected and interviewed 1,010 peasants in the Central Luzon province of Nueva Ecija. Although the primary purpose of the survey was to study the attitudes of various tenure groups toward landlords and aspects of the government's land reform programs, it collected information on the respondents' background, living conditions, farming productivity, and other things.⁴

Because the surveyors were interested in land tenure, they made certain that the sample represented major types of cultivators: those who owned the land they tilled (owners), those who owned some of the land they tilled but rented the rest (part owners), those who leased the land they farmed by paying landlords a fixed amount in either rice or cash (lessees), those who leased some of the land they cultivated but sharecropped the rest (lessee-share tenants), and those who rented the land by paying a certain percentage (usually between 40 to 50 percent) of the harvest to the landowner (share tenants).⁵ The distribution of the sample was 114 owners or 11.3 percent, 68 part-owners or 6.7 percent, 409 lessees or 40.5 percent, 44 lessee-share tenants or 4.4 percent, and 375 share tenants or 37.1 percent.⁶

Like any sample survey, this one has limitations. At a general level, the survey inherently captures at best only a glimpse of the villagers' lives. A structured interview, lasting an hour or two, can cull only information that interviewer and respondent can mention in such a situation. Surveys are useful to get a little bit of information from a large number of people, but are a poor method for getting detail, inuendo, and relaxed dialogue. They generally prevent the interviewer from learning about anything other than what he or she especially asks. For our particular interests, this survey also lacks information that we would have wanted, for instance, some data about villagers' earnings were too skimpy. We would have especially liked information about costs so that we could compare net rather than gross incomes. Since the survey asks villagers to evaluate landlords in general, rather than their particular landlords, we have difficulties interpreting correlations between types of tenure and their attitudes toward landlords. We do not know if those who rented or leased land were thinking of their own landlords — and if so, which ones and when, inasmuch as many of these villagers have had several landlords over a lifetime and several had more than one at the time of the survey. The questionnaire's classification of houses' building materials — "light," "mixed," and "concrete" — is too vague. Light could include bamboo and palm leaves, which would be rather inexpensive, or it could mean wood, which represents a much greater investment of the owner's time and money. We also do not know if a house with a concrete floor or a layer of hollow blocks around the perimeter would constitute a "mixed" house. One group conspicuously missing from the sample is agricultural workers who, according to the 1970 census, make up about 22 percent of the people who farm for a living.⁷ This omission is a serious one because we would have preferred to compare all types of agriculturalists, not just those who regularly have access to land.

We will have more to say later about limitations of the survey and our own analysis. For

now, we shall describe what we did and interpret the results.

Steps in the Analysis

Our analysis had essentially three steps.⁸ First, we correlated villagers' tenure status with a number of variables. Second, we correlated the same variables with the per capita gross income (or earnings) of each villager's family. This value we computed from the IPC data.⁹ Third, we tried several "controls." After dividing per capita income into several ranges, we controlled for each range and then correlated tenure status with the same set of variables. We reasoned that this would differentiate villagers better than either tenure status or per capita family income alone, if for no other reason than, unlike owners, tenants have to share their crops with landlords. Then we controlled for type of tenure and correlated per capita income with those variables. And within each range, we correlated per capita income with the same variables. Each step included cross-tabulations, scatter diagrams, and correlations.¹⁰ From time to time, we also looked at the data in other ways in hopes of shedding light on the results from these three main steps. Where they did, we will report them in the next section.

The variables against which we compared villagers according to tenure and per capita income compose four categories. The first includes background variables: education, age, number of farms the villager had previously cultivated, whether parents or grandparents had cultivated land he now farms. The second type are, as best as we could get them from the data, indicators of living conditions: materials for house, home size, family size. Third, several variables indicate sources of livelihood and related economic conditions. Area and productivity for three crop periods – July-December 1969 (wet season), January-June 1970 (dry season), and July-December 1970 (wet season); whether the land each respondent farmed had no irrigation, was partially irrigated, or was fully irrigated; and number of separate plots the

villager cultivates describe farming conditions. Whether people sold rice,¹¹ amount of money respondents and their household members annually earned to supplement their rice farming, and whether villagers loaned and/or borrowed (cash or "in kind") provide additional information about villagers' economic situation.¹² Finally, several variables concern other attitudes and behaviors of the villagers: whether they were members of "farmers' organization" in their barrios and, if so, how many; if their barrios had no farmers' organizations, would the villagers want them; and villagers' rankings of landlords on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).¹³ (See Table 1 for all variables and scales.)

When we divided the population into per capita income ranges, we had in mind a couple of ideas. First, scholars have paid some attention to poverty thresholds for peasants in Third World countries. A few have done so for the Philippines. One problem in the Philippine case, however, is that researchers, rather than villagers, define what is poverty and these definitions are not consistent from article to article. The studies also generalize about the whole country or all rural areas. We had no estimates for Nueva Ecija in particular. Using an article by Ma. Alcestis S. Abrera (1976: 223-274), which is the most thoughtful one we have found to date, we put the midpoint of the "poverty range" at ₱824 per capita for rural families in Nueva Ecija. So as not to give the impression of precision, we made the range about ₱824 plus or minus ₱100. Above this range we let the array of data guide us to some extent. Where there were noticeable gaps, as there was after ₱1,590, we drew lines. We could think of no reasonable way, however, to divide those incomes between the upper limit of the poverty range (₱924) and ₱1,590. So we made that another range.

For people whose per capita income was less than poverty (less than ₱723), we defined additional ranges by keeping in mind studies that have talked about minimal subsistence

Table 1
VARIABLES AND SCALES

Variable	Scale and Coding
Per capita family income (pesos)	0—X (highest value is 10,965)
Tenure status	(0) Share tenant, (1) Lessee-share tenant, (2) Lessee tenant, (3) Part-owner, (4) owner
<i>Background</i>	
Formal education (years)	(0) None, (1) 1-5, (2) 6, (3) 7+
Age (years)	(1) Below 25, (2) 25-39, (3) 40-54, (4) 55+
Number of farms previously cultivated	0—X (highest value is 3)
Parents/grandparents cultivated present farm	
Share cropped land	(0) Neither parents nor grandparents, (1) Grandparents but not parents, (2) Parents or parents and grandparents
Leased land	(0) " " (1) " "
Own land	(0) " " (1) " "
<i>Living Conditions</i>	
House materials	(0) Light, (1) Mixed, (2) Concrete
Home size (square meters)	(1) Less than 20, (2) 20-59.9, (3) 60-99.9, (4) 100-139.9, (5) 140+
Family size (members in household)	(0) 1-2, (1) 3-4, (2) 5-6, (3) 7-8, (4) 9-10, (5) 11-12, (6) 13+
<i>Livelihood and Economic Conditions</i>	
Area (July-Dec. 1969), rice (ha.)	(0) Less than 2, (1) 2-2.9, (2) 3-3.9, (3) 4-4.9, (4) 5-5.9, (5) 6+
Area (Jan.-June 1970), rice (ha.)	(0) None, (1) Less than 2, (2) 2-2.9, (3) 3-3.9, (4) 4-4.9, (5) 5-5.9, (6) 6+
Area (July-Dec. 1970), rice (ha.)	(0) Less than 2, (1) 2-2.9, (2) 3-3.9, (3) 4-4.9, (4) 5-5.9, (5) 6+
Productivity (July-Dec. 1969), rice (cavans) (ha.)	(0) Less than 20, (1) 20-29.9, (2) 30-39.9, (3) 40-49.9, (4) 50-59.9, (5) 60-69.9, (6) 70-79.9, (7) 80+
Productivity (Jan.-June 1970), rice (cavans) (ha.)	" " " " " "
Productivity (July-Dec. 1970), rice (cavans) (ha.)	" " " " " "
Irrigation	(0) Not irrigated, (1) Some irrigation, (2) Totally irrigated
Number of farm plots	0—X (highest value is 3)
Selling rice	(0) Did not sell last year, (1) Sold but consulted no one, (2) Sold after consulting one or more people
Supplementary household earnings (pesos)	(0) None, (1) 1-299.99, (2) 300-599.99, (3) 600-899.99, (4) 900-1,999.99, (5) 1,200-1,499.99, (6) 1,500-1,799.99, (7) 1,800-2,099.99, (8) 2,100+
Borrow money/in-kind	(0) Did not borrow, (1) Borrowed
Lend money/in-kind	(0) Did not lend, (1) Lent
<i>Attitudes</i>	
Farmers organization membership	(0) Member of none, (1) Member/leader of one, (2) Member/leader of 2, (3) Member/leader of 3
Want farmers' organizations	(0) Does not want organization, (1) Wants organization
Ranking landlords	(0) (lowest) — 10 (highest)

needs. That literature suggests that subsistence is even less than poverty level. In James C. Scott's words,

The subsistence crisis level – perhaps a “danger zone” rather than “level” would be more accurate – is a threshold below which the qualitative deterioration in subsistence, security, status, and family social cohesion is massive and painful. It is the difference between the “normal” penury of peasant life and a literally “hand-to-mouth” existence (1976:17).¹⁴

As Scott indicates, subsistence can have both “subjective” (i.e., as a villager himself would know it) and “objective” (i.e., the human body can live on only so little food and water) meanings. Lacking information from this

particular survey or adequate data on this subject for Nueva Ecija villagers from other sources, we again had to make an informed guess. We drew on two studies (Montemayor, 1975: 39-46, 54-58, 71-76, 83-86, 96-103; Kerkvliet, 1974) that did have information on incomes, expenditures, and basic or minimal needs for several individuals who farmed or who worked as agricultural laborers in the early 1970s in Nueva Ecija. From those we estimated that the “subsistence range” at the time of this IPC survey was ₱205-400 per capita. We then designated those below this as “less than subsistence.” The remaining range is above subsistence but below poverty (₱400-723). Table 2 gives the frequencies for each range.

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA GROSS INCOME FOR HOUSEHOLDS OF VILLAGERS INTERVIEWED IN IPC SURVEY

	Per Capita Gross Income Range (in pesos)	Frequency	Percent
<i>Below poverty</i>			
Less than subsistence	0 - 205	111	11
Subsistence	205.1 - 400	177	18
Above subsistence, below poverty	400.1 - 723	282	28
<i>Poverty</i>	723.1 - 924	125	13
<i>Above poverty</i>			
Below comfortable	924.1 - 1,590	189	19
<i>Comfortable and above</i>			
Comfortable	1,590.1 - 2,400	75	7
More than comfortable	2,400.1 - 4,100	48	5
Well off	4,100.1 plus	7	1
Total		1,007	102*

Mean: ₱861

Median: ₱635

Range: 0-10,965

Number of respondents with missing data: 3

*Greater than 100 percent due to rounding.

Finally, we need to justify our scale for tenure status. We ranked tenure on an ascending scale: share tenant, lessee-share, lessee, part-owner, owner. This is in keeping with the idea found frequently in peasant studies' literature that a peasant's position should improve as he gains a firmer hold on land. Those with the firmest hold would be landowners, followed by those who own some of the land even though they rent additional land. Leaseholders rank above share tenants, at least in the Philippines, because the contract they have with the landlord supposedly gives them a permanent claim to the land they rent and, according to the government's land reform program as of 1970-71, they are in line to purchase eventually that land. Share tenants have neither of these two advantages, although these are not necessarily sufficient to persuade them to lease land (Pahlanga-de los Reyes and Lynch, 1972; Kerkvliet, 1974).

Interpretations

In addition to Table 2, Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 summarize the quantitative results. They show the product-moment correlations for paired variables for each step. What they suggest, we think, is this: we cannot clearly stratify villagers in the sample according to their tenure status, gross earnings, proximity to subsistence and poverty levels, or combinations of all three. Some relationships, however, are statistically significant at 0.05 or higher levels, but these do vary when we break the sample into subgroups. We begin to elaborate by discussing each group of variables.

None of the correlations for background variables are outstandingly high. The amount of formal education, which varied considerably within each tenure group (see Table 7), was not closely associated with tenure. Controlling for tenure status, however, we found that education is more meaningfully associated with incomes of share tenants than for others. And the relationship between education and earn-

ings is stronger at higher rather than lower income ranges. Status and per capita earnings are slightly related, but opposite from what we had expected (-.06). Households of tenant farmers and lessees tend slightly to have higher incomes than those of owners and part-owners. Table 8 also illustrates this; mean and median incomes are higher for share and lessee-share tenants than for other tenure groups. This small inverse relationship, however, does bounce around among several per capita income levels, and even becomes positive (.15) in the ₱924.1-1,590 range.

Although far from denoting major differences among villagers, age and two variables regarding farming background help a little more than other variables here. Within each income level and for the whole sample, older villagers are somewhat more likely than younger ones to be owners, part-owners, and lessees. This probably reflects the trend in Central Luzon in the 20th century for the percentage of tenancy to increase and the percentage of land ownership to decline. In recent decades, younger farmers have had more difficulties than their forebears did to become owners.¹⁵ The number of farms people cultivated in their life (prior to the ones farmed at the time of the survey) is moderately and inversely related (-.09) to gross earnings. The relationship becomes stronger (-.25 and -.20) for two of the higher income levels. Share tenants' per capita income and the fact that their grandparents and/or parents farmed the same plot they sharecrop are also noticeably related (.16). These moderate relationships reinforce the generally acknowledged importance of stable and secure access to land for villagers' well-being.

Among the living condition variables, family size is unrelated to tenure but significantly and inversely related to per capita income (-.35).¹⁶ This relationship is nearly constant for all tenure types, although it varies from one income range to the next such that practically

Table 3
**CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) OF TENURE STATUS AND PER CAPITA
 HOUSEHOLD INCOME WITH OTHER VARIABLES**

	Tenure Status	Per Capita Household Income
<i>Background</i>		
Education	.07*	.07*
Age	.15**	.08**
Number of farms previously cultivated	-.05	-.09**
Parents/grandparents cultivated present farm		
Sharecropped land	-.02	.15**
Leased land	.03	-.03
Owned land	-.10	-.07
Tenure status		-.06*
<i>Living Conditions</i>		
House materials	.22**	.16**
Home size	.09**	.03
Family size	-.02	-.35**
<i>Livelihood and Economic Conditions</i>		
Area (July-Dec. 1969), rice (ha.)	.03	.41**
Area (Jan.-June 1970), rice (ha.)	-.08*	.38**
Area (July-Dec. 1970), rice (ha.)	.04	.38**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1969), rice (cavans) (ha.)	.03	.27**
Productivity (Jan.-June 1970), rice (cavans) (ha.)	-.04	.24**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1970), rice (cavans) (ha.)	-.10**	.27**
Irrigation	-.14**	.23**
Number of farm plots	-.05	.11**
Selling rice	.15**	.07*
Supplementary household earnings	.08**	.03
Borrow money/in-kind	.00	-.14**
Lend money/in-kind	.00	.00
<i>Attitudes</i>		
Farmers organization membership	.09*	.07
Want farmers organizations	-.11**	-.12**
Ranking landlords	-.10**	-.01

*Statistically significant at the 0.01-0.05 level.

**Statistically significant at the 0.009 level.

Table 4

CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) OF PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME,
BY INCOME RANGE, WITH OTHER VARIABLES

	Less than Subsistence 0-205 pesos	Subsistence 205.1- 400 pesos	Above Subsistence Below Poverty 400.1-723 pesos	Below Poverty 0-723 pesos 1590 pesos.	Poverty 723.1- 924 pesos	Above Poverty Below Com- fortable 924.1 1,590 pesos	Comfortable and Above 1,590.1- 10,965 pesos	All cases 0- 10,965 pesos
<i>Background</i>								
Education	-.05	.05	-.15**	.00	.17*	.19**	.23**	.07*
Age	-.17*	-.07	-.01	-.02	.01	.02	.06	.08**
Number of farms previously cultivated	-.05	-.10	-.01	-.02	-.25**	-.20**	-.06	-.09**
Parents/grandparents cultivated present farm								
Share cropped land	.03	-.04	-.08	.06	.22**	.27**	.52**	.15**
Leased land	.10	.18*	.10	.12*	-.03	-.09	-.18	-.03
Owned land	-.12	.28	.16	.17*	.00	.05	-.25	-.07
Tenure status	-.26**	.00	.04	-.12**	-.11	.15*	-.12	-.06*
<i>Living Conditions</i>								
House materials	-.19*	-.08	.00	.06	.06	-.03	.20*	.16**
Home size	.00	-.14*	-.10*	-.02	-.03	.15*	.02	.03
Family Size	.06	.07	-.20**	-.05	-.08	-.06	-.38**	-.35**
<i>Livelihood and Economic Conditions</i>								
Area (July-Dec. 1969), rice	-.20	.36**	.07	.36**	.28**	-.03	.10	.41**
Area (Jan.-June 1970), rice (no cases)	.10	.15**	.24**	.09	.27**	-.03	.38**	.38**
Area (July-Dec. 1970), rice	.02	.20**	.02	.29**	.23**	.06	.08	.38**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1969), rice	.43*	.07	.22**	.38**	-.14	.03	.21*	.27**
Productivity (Jan.-June 1970), rice (no cases)	.44**	.07	-.30*	-.31*	.24	.23*	.06	.24**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1970), rice (only one case)	.20**	.07	.35**	-.10	.09	.18	.27**	.27**
Irrigation	-.06	-.12	.08	.13**	-.10	.11	.03	.23**
Number of farm plots	-.41**	.08	-.02	-.18**	-.01	-.01	.14	.11**
Selling rice	-.35**	-.02	.11*	.03	.08	.02	-.01	.07*
Supplementary household earnings	.35**	-.05	-.13*	.15**	-.03	.01	.01	.03
Borrow money/in-kind	-.16	-.13*	-.01	-.03	.14	.03	-.14	-.14**
Loan money/in-kind	.07	.00	.02	.01	-.07	.09	-.11	.00
<i>Attitudes</i>								
Farmers organization membership	-.23	-.27*	.10	.00	.17	-.01	-.23	.07
Want farmers' organizations	.09	-.18*	-.03	.08	.04	.16	-.05	-.12**
Ranking landlords	.24**	-.08	.01	.05	-.09	.04	-.04	-.01

*Statistically significant at the 0.01-0.05 level

**Statistically significant at the 0.009 level

Table 5
CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) BETWEEN TENURE STATUS AND SEVERAL VARIABLES FOR EACH OF FOUR
PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGES AND FOR ALL CASES

	Tenure Status (Below poverty 0-723 pesos)	Tenure Status (Poverty: 723.1- 924 pesos)	Tenure Status (Above poverty, below comfortable 924.1-1,590 pesos)	Tenure Status (Comfortable and above 1,590.1 + pesos)	Tenure Status (All cases)
<i>Background</i>					
Education	.06	.15	.08	.03	.07*
Age	.16**	.13	.19**	.09	.15**
Number of farms previously cultivated	-.06	.02	-.07	-.07**	-.05
Parents/grandparents cultivated present farm					
Share cropped land	-.04	-.19	.02	.02	-.02
Leased land	-.05	.11	.17	.07	.03
Own land	.07	-.21	-.29	-.58**	-.10
Tenure status					
<i>Living Conditions</i>					
House materials	.21**	.21**	.27**	.26**	.22**
Home size	.07*	.09	.08	.20*	.09**
Family size	-.07*	-.21*	.04	.13	-.02
<i>Livelihood and Economic Conditions</i>					
Area (July-Dec. 1969), rice	-.01	-.06	.12	.19*	.03
Area (Jan.-June 1970), rice	-.10*	-.12	-.19**	-.08	-.08*
Area (July-Dec. 1970), rice	.02	-.16*	.09	.22*	.04
Productivity (July-Dec. 1969), rice	-.05	-.07	.04	.07	.03
Productivity (Jan. June 1970), rice	.10	-.49*	-.02	-.18	-.04
Productivity (July-Dec. 1970), rice	-.09*	-.10	-.15*	-.04	-.10*
Irrigation	-.09*	-.16*	-.25**	-.14	-.14**
Number of farm plots	.02	-.08	-.25**	.02	-.05
Selling rice	.16**	.33**	.04	.10	.15**
Supplementary household earnings	.04	-.10	.20**	.23**	.08**
Borrow money/in-kind	.03	.00	-.13*	.00	.00
Loan money/in-kind	-.02	.27**	-.14*	-.02	.00
<i>Attitudes</i>					
Farmers organization membership	.09	.15	.11	.31*	.09*
Want farmers' organizations	-.15**	-.40**	.05	.01	-.11**
Ranking landlords	-.15**	.10	-.17*	-.03	-.10**

*Statistically significant at 0.01-0.05 level.

**Statistically significant at .009 level.

Table 6
CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) BETWEEN PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME
AND SEVERAL VARIABLES FOR EACH TENURE GROUP AND FOR ALL CASES

	Per Capita Income (share tenants)	Per Capita Income (lessee 'share tenants)	Per Capita Income (lessee tenants)	Per Capita Income (part- owners)	Per Capita Income (owners)	Per Capita Income (all cases)
<i>Background</i>						
Education	.18**	-.25*	.05	-.11	.11	.07**
Age	.06	.20	.16**	-.09	.05	.08**
Number of farms previously cultivated	-.10*	.08	-.12**	-.24*	-.02	-.09**
Parents/grandparents cultivated present farm						
Sharecropped land	.12**	.08	(no cases)	.06	(no cases)	.15**
Leased land	(no cases)	-.02	-.06	.16	(no cases)	-.03
Owned land	(no cases)	(no cases)	(no cases)	.19	-.16*	-.07
Tenure status						.06*
<i>Living Conditions</i>						
House materials	.17**	.38**	.19**	.09	.17*	.16**
Home size	.00	-.23	.12**	.05	.16*	.03
Family size	-.42**	-.08	-.33**	.04	-.40**	-.35**
<i>Livelihood and Economic Conditions</i>						
Area (July-Dec. 1969), rice	.38**	a	.50**	a	.51	.41**
Area (Jan.-June 1970), rice	.35**	a	.59**	a	.62**	.38**
Area (July-Dec. 1970), rice	.37**	a	.44**	a	.50**	.38**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1969), rice	.23**	a	.30**	a	.44**	.27**
Productivity (Jan.-June 1970), rice	.19*	a	.38**	a	.11	.24**
Productivity (July-Dec. 1970), rice	.24**	a	.30**	a	.41**	.27**
Irrigation	.20**	.20	.31**	.21*	.21*	.23**
Number of farm plots	.12*	-.15	.11*	-.06	(no data)	.11**
Selling rice	.12*	-.03	.12**	-.11	.07	.07*
Supplementary household earnings	.01	-.04	.08	-.09	.24**	.03
Borrow money/in-kind	-.10*	-.18	-.09*	-.46**	-.12	-.14**
Loan money/in-kind	.00	-.03	.01	.14	-.10	.00
<i>Attitudes</i>						
Farmers organization membership	-.03	-.10	.19**	.27	.23	.07
Want farmers organizations	-.08	-.40*	-.10	-.04	-.02	-.12**
Ranking landlords	-.06	.06	-.04	.05	.24**	-.01

^aSee footnote 4.

*Statistically significant at the 0.01-0.05 level.

**Statistically significant at the 0.009 level.

Table 7

FORMAL EDUCATION BY TENURE STATUS

Tenure Status	Formal Education				
	Zero Years	1-5 Years	6 Years	7 Years or More	
Share tenant	43 (11.5)	181 (48.5)	100 (26.8)	49 (13.1)	373
Lessee-share tenant	4 (9.1)	23 (52.3)	9 (20.5)	8 (18.2)	44
Lessee tenant	49 (12.1)	214 (53.0)	98 (24.3)	43 (10.6)	404
Part-owner	5 (7.6)	29 (43.9)	14 (21.2)	18 (27.3)	66
Owner	14 (12.4)	37 (32.7)	33 (29.2)	29 (25.7)	113

Number in parentheses are row percentages.

Chi square = 33.06 (12 degrees of freedom; significance = 0.0009.)

Table 8

MEANS AND MEDIANS OF PER CAPITA
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY TENURE STATUS

	Mean (pesos)	Median (pesos)
Share tenants	921	647
Lessee-share tenants	1,131	847
Lessee tenants	802	620
Part-owners	819	406
Owners	800	604
All cases	861	635

no relationship exists at the lowest levels. Table 9 also illustrates the differences in family size; mean and median sizes decline noticeably as income level rises. The strong inverse correlation leaves unanswered, however, the question of what causes which. Do large families tend to cause low incomes, or do low incomes lead to large families? We will venture an answer when we discuss farming conditions later.

Durability of housing materials is related to status (.22) and somewhat less so to per capita earnings (.16). These relationships remain when we controlled for status to see the effect of earnings, and vice versa. But it disappears within various income levels, except for the top range (.20). We made the most sense of home-size by controlling for each income range, then correlating it with family (Table 10). As one would expect, large families do not get larger houses until, maybe, their incomes increase. We quickly add, however, that the "larger" houses are modest increases: 86 percent or more of the houses for all income levels were less than 60 square meters, the "larger" homes, which were more frequent in the upper income ranges, were only 60-99 square meters.

Regarding farming conditions, the number of land parcels people cultivate indicates nothing about their tenure status (-.05). It says a little about their gross incomes (.11), but the relationship varies across income ranges. In the lowest range, three parcels, even two, generally mean less income than one (-.41). The most likely explanation is that the parcels are poor quality and/or spread apart, thus making attending to them difficult. Having more than one farm has virtually no relationship to income in the other ranges. Notably, no one earning more than ₱1,700 had more than two parcels, and well over half of them had only one.

Also unrelated to status are farm area and productivity in any of the three harvests for which the survey collected data. This jibes with other studies (Mangahas *et al.*, 1976:23-38;

Ruttan, 1966:42-63; Cheung, 1969) that have found that small landowners are not necessarily more productive rice growers than tenant farmers but contradicts Philippine government officials' claims that tenant farmers are less productive than small owners. Indeed, to the extent there is any relationship in these IPC data, it is inverse: tenants and lessees are more productive than owners (-.10 in the July-December 1970 season), a relationship that holds up across most income ranges. Tenants also are more likely to be farming irrigated land (-.14 for the whole sample, higher for some income ranges), which undoubtedly explains why they, more than others, can farm during the January-June dry season (-.08 for all cases, higher in some income ranges). To investigate this question further, we controlled for irrigation and found owners and part-owners are slightly more productive than lessees and share-tenants if they have no irrigated land, but the reverse is true on irrigated land (see Table 11). We also discovered a statistically significant inverse relationship, for all respondents and for all tenure types and income ranges, between area and productivity, especially for share-tenants and people in the poverty or lower income ranges (Table 12). The tendency for greater productivity on less land may reflect difficulties villagers have finding necessary inputs (fertilizer, insecticides, labor, etc.) the more land they have to cultivate, a problem that would be more serious for those with consistently low incomes. It may also verify the generally held notion that bigger plots in Nueva Ecija are less fertile lands.

A word about the selling of rice. As one would expect, it is somewhat associated with status (.15) and per capita income (.07). People who sell rice are probably those whose production exceeds what their families need.¹⁷ Small landowners are more likely in this situation than share tenants or even lessees because the latter have to pay a portion of their production to land rent. Significantly, 24 percent of all respondents (a figure that is 7 percent higher for share-tenants, 3 percent lower for lessees

Table 9

**MEAN AND MEDIAN FAMILY SIZES BY
TENURE STATUS AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGE**

	Mean	Median
Tenure Status		
Share tenants	6.9	6.8
Lessee-share tenants	7.2	7.2
Lessee tenants	7.2	7.1
Part-owners	7.5	7.5
Owners	6.1	5.6
Per Capita Family Income Range (pesos)		
0-205	7.6	7.5
205.1-400	7.8	7.7
400.1-723	7.6	7.5
723.1-924	6.5	6.2
924.1-1,590	6.5	6.3
1,590.1+	5.0	4.8
All cases	7.0	6.9

Table 10

**CORRELATION (PEARSON'S r) BETWEEN FAMILY SIZE AND HOME SIZE
BY TENURE STATUS AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGE**

Tenure Status	Family Size Against Home Size
Share tenants	.20**
Lessee-share tenants	-.18
Lessee tenants	.06
Part-owners	.18
Owners	-.09
Per Capita Family Income Range (pesos)	
0-205	.04
205.1-400	.02
400.1-723	.11*
723.1-924	.20*
924.1-1,590	.11
1,590.1+	.19*
All cases	.09**

*Statistically significant at 0.01-0.05 level.

**Statistically significant at .009 level.

Table 11
CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) OF TENURE STATUS
AND PRODUCTIVITY, CONTROLLING FOR IRRIGATION

	Rice land not irrigated	Rice land partially irrigated	Rice land totally irrigated
Tenure Status correlated with:			
Productivity July-Dec. 1969	.09*	-.11	-.02
Productivity Jan.-June 1970	.53	-.19	-.05
Productivity July-Dec. 1970	.02	-.18*	-.14**

*Statistically significant at 0.01-0.05 range.

**Statistically significant at level 0.009

Table 12
CORRELATIONS (PEARSON'S r) BETWEEN AREA AND PRODUCTIVITY
OF RICE FARMING (JULY-DECEMBER 1969 AND JULY-DECEMBER 1970) BY
TENURE STATUS AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGE

	Area Against Productivity	
	July-December 1969	July-December 1970
Tenure Status		
Share tenants	-.13**	-.12*
Lessee-share tenants	-	-
Lessee tenants	.00	-.08
Part-owners	-	-
Owners	-.06	-.04
Per Capita Family Income Range (pesos)		
0-205	-.34*	-.25*
205.1-400	-.51**	-.46**
400.1-723	-.38**	-.39**
723.1-924	-.29**	-.26**
924.1-1,590	-.19**	-.16*
1,590+	-.19*	-.31**
All cases	-.07*	-.10**

*Statistically significant at 0.01-0.05 level

**Statistically significant at 0.009 level

and 8 percent lower for owners) sold no rice in the year prior to the survey. While a sizeable percentage, it is smaller than a comparable figure for Central Luzon as a whole 20 years ago, and is indicative of the trend for more peasants to sell rice in order to get scarce cash.¹⁸

Unlike status, villagers' per capita household earnings correlate positively and strongly with productivity, area, and irrigation.¹⁹ Looking at percentage figures, we saw, for instance, that whereas 46 percent of those interviewed villagers earning less than ₱1,590 have no irrigated land and 37 percent have fully irrigated land, only 15 percent of those with more than ₱1,590 per capita earnings have no irrigation but 65 percent have fully irrigated land. Whereas 84 percent of those earning less than ₱1,590 had no rice crop in the 1970 dry season (which requires a good irrigation system), 55 percent of those earning over ₱1,590 had a dry season rice crop. And during the regular, wet growing seasons of 1969 and 1970, 70 percent of those earning less than ₱1,590 farmed less than 3 hectares while 75 percent of those above ₱1,590 farmed more than 3 hectares.

The correlations, however, vary from one income range to the next. They are more consistent and larger when we controlled for status. Those tenants, lessees, and owners with larger, more irrigated, and more productive lands have a decided advantage over their fellow villagers. Certainly, this is not surprising. What is notable, however, is that these more favored peasants are comparable regardless of their tenure status. Productivity and area, especially, vary more within status groups than among them.

We have wondered why the correlations between income and area and productivity tend to be stronger for owners and lessees than for share tenants. A possible explanation is Akira Takahashi's observation in neighboring Bulacan province that share tenants, especially, put less energy into rice farming and more into

working as wage laborers and in small sideline businesses (Takahashi, 1969:129-132). Our examination of the income villagers earned to supplement their rice farming sheds light on this issue and on the importance of family size for people's earnings.

Relationships among per capita income, status, and supplementary household earnings appear only after we broke the population into sub-samples. While not related to per capita earnings for all villagers, supplementary income is significantly correlated with per capita income of owners (.24) and of people in the "less than subsistence" range (.35). The latter association indicates the importance of catch-as-catch-can work for these families. And while supplementary income and status are barely related, if one looks at the whole sample (.08), the two are more related in the upper income ranges (.20 and .23).

To investigate further these results, we correlated rice production and supplemental income for all villagers and for each tenure status and income range. We wondered whether people with larger rice harvests were also the ones with larger supplemental income, or whether they were more likely to have small or no supplemental earnings. Some of the literature on peasants led us to expect the latter. The gist of the argument is that peasants who have access to land either as tenants or small owners are inclined to seek additional income only when expected farm produce is insufficient to meet their modest needs. This is part of the theory that peasants generally try to maximize their security rather than their earnings. (Scott, 1976; Weeks, 1970:28-36; Lipton, 1968:327-351; Chayanov, 1966).

The calculations show, indeed, a small inverse relationship (-.05) for all villagers in the sample (Table 13). More interestingly, the inverse relationship is especially strong for tenant farmers (-.14) and for people below or in the poverty range (-.17, less than subsistence; -.41, subsistence; -.44, above sub-

Table 13

*CORRELATION (PEARSON'S r) OF PESO VALUE OF RICE PRODUCTION (1969-1970)
AND SUPPLEMENTAL HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS, BY TENURE STATUS
AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGE*

	Value of Rice Production Against Supplemental Family Income
Tenure Status	
Share tenant	-.14**
Lessee-share tenant	-.12
Lessee tenant	-.01
Part-owner	-.15
Owner	.17*
Per Capita Family Income Range (pesos)	
0-205	-.17*
205.1-400	-.41**
400.1-723	-.44**
723.1-924	-.31**
924.1-1,590	-.14*
1,590+	.02
All cases	-.05*

*Statistically significant at 0.01-0.05 level.

**Statistically significant at 0.009 level.

sistence but below poverty; -.31, poverty). Significantly, too, the people in the middle two income ranges (P400.1 to P924) have the highest mean and median supplemental incomes. The lower income people also have the greater proportion of families with non-rice farming incomes: 58 percent for those earning 0-924 pesos compared to 48 percent for those above P924. Moreover, only in the "below subsistence" and "subsistence" ranges are there families who, at least in 1969-1970, depend solely on "supplemental" income (38 percent and 8 percent, respectively).

These results support the generalization that, for most villagers, the more they can farm, the less they will get (or look for) other work.

People want supplemental income when they cannot grow enough rice or cannot expect to retain enough of the harvest, probably for such reasons as having to pay a sizeable share to landlords or taxes, fearing poor crops on infertile land, and having too little money (either saved from previous year's crop or borrowed) to purchase adequate amounts of fertilizer and other inputs required of the high-yielding rice varieties most Nueva Ecijanós grow. The exceptions to this tendency are those in the highest income range, for whom rice production and supplemental earnings are unrelated (although among these, less than half even have non-rice farming income), and small landowners. Owners, unlike other tenure groups, apparently are more likely to rely on

Table 14
**RANGE, MEAN, AND MEDIAN OF
 AVERAGE RICE PRODUCTION (3 SEASONS),
 BY TENURE STATUS**

	Range (cavans)	Mean (cavans)	Median (cavans)
Tenure Status			
Share tenant	0-1,084	260	219
Lessee-share tenant	0-1,581	385	338
Lessee tenant	0-1,339	270	207
Part-owner	0-1,294	295	159
Owner	0- 726	198	160
All Cases	0-1,581	265	207

rice farming and other work for their household incomes (see Table 13). We can only speculate why. Inasmuch as the mean and median of their rice production are low and their range is the smallest, they more than other tenure groups need additional work (Table 14).²⁰

Supplemental earnings are also positively associated with family size for all respondents (.08), especially for those in the lowest income ranges (see Table 15). This is modest evidence to support the idea found in some literature that poverty tends to promote larger families rather than vice versa.²¹ These data suggest that peasants with larger families have a better chance of increasing their household income. That the relationship holds also for highest income range as well as the lowest ones may be interpreted as contrary evidence for this idea. But it could also mean that families in this group, even though apparently better off than most in the sample, are not yet sufficiently well-off or sufficiently secure that they can afford smaller families.

Among the fourth set of variables, tenants in the below poverty and, especially, the poverty ranges (-.15 and -.40, respectively)

are more likely than owners and part-owners to want "farmers' organizations." This relationship, however, disappears in the other income ranges. Yet villagers who are actually members of established farmers organizations are more likely owners than tenant farmers, especially in the highest income range (.31).

To interpret those relationships, however, one would have to know about the organizations themselves. "Farmers' organizations" is too broad a category for Nueva Ecija, which has had a variety of such groups—some militant, others closely tied to local and national governments.

The final scale worth mentioning is villagers' rankings of landlords. While one might well expect share tenants to be more inclined than other peasants to rank landlords low, we knew from Pahilanga-de los Reyes (1971) to expect the opposite. The correlation shows this (-.10), although the relationship does fluctuate within various per capita income ranges. Another way to compare share tenants with others is to look at the percentage of people in each group who placed landlords at the top three ranks: share tenants, 61 percent; lessee-share tenants, 38 percent; lessee tenants, 48 percent; part-owners, 34 percent; owners, 50 percent.

Table 15
**CORRELATION (PEARSON'S r) BETWEEN
 FAMILY SIZE AND ADDITIONAL HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS
 BY TENURE STATUS AND PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME RANGE**

	Family Size against Additional Household Earnings
Tenure Status	
Share tenants	-.01
Lessee tenants	.19
Lessees	.16**
Part-owners	.20*
Owners	.04
Per Capita Family Income Range (pesos)	
0-205	.15
205.1-400	.18**
400.1-723	.06
723.1-924	.06
924.1-1,590	.06
1,590.1+	.17*
All cases	.08**

*Statistically significant at the 0.01-0.05 level

**Statistically significant at the 0.009 level.

Conclusions

Using data from a 1971 survey in one Philippine province, we have investigated the extent to which status and income differentiate peasants. We have essentially only been able to confirm what others, including peasants themselves, know: village society is too intricate to stratify on the basis of land tenure. And measures of income are also insufficient.²² True, there are differences among villagers. Some live in better constructed houses than others; some have larger and more productive plots of land. Some have lucrative supplemental incomes, while others have irregular sources, and still more have none at all. But along what lines and

cleavages such differences lie, we cannot say other than they do not readily jibe with tenure or per capita income. The major exceptions are land area, productivity, and irrigation, which do correlate positively strongly and rather consistently within various subsamples with per capita income, but not tenure status. Family size is strongly, but negatively, related to per capita household income for several subsamples and for the whole sample.

We acknowledge other manipulations of these data are possible. They might yield clearer distinctions among villagers than we discovered. But we doubt it for two reasons. First, this exercise and our knowledge of

peasant societies from our experiences in the Philippines, Thailand and from other people's research impress on us the complexities of village society. Second, while we think it is possible to identify and explain strata within peasant societies, these data are insufficient. Earlier we mentioned some of the data's limitations for this purpose. But a larger weakness lies in the kinds of questions the survey omits and perhaps with the very method of survey research itself. To elaborate, we see some areas about which the data are silent or nearly so. But were we to know more we might be able to reach one of two conclusions. First, we might still find that peasant strata are too complicated to identify, but be able to explain why and how such complexity exists in village society. Second, from the knowledge we might find some criteria, other than the two we explored in this study, for differentiating peasants. Then, we should be able to show that village society is not too intricate to stratify. Information on quality of personal relationships and history are examples of the kind of knowledge we are talking about. We do not mean to criticize the researchers who designed and conducted the survey; after all, their primary purposes were different from those for which we have used the data. Rather, we want to dwell on an argument that we might have anticipated before even beginning the analysis but appreciate better afterwards.

As literature on peasant societies often shows, the quality of relationships villagers have with kinfolk, each other, and non-villagers is important for understanding their lives. For example, labor exchanges and other reciprocal ties among villagers — and sometimes transcending several villages — augment people's welfare. So do strong kinship bonds, which are especially crucial during lean years. Similarly, to the extent to which "sharing-the-poverty" and other levelling mechanisms still work in village society, they help people to bear collectively the poverty that befalls them and pressure others who are more fortunate to share.²³ If there are two peasants of equal income and

tenure, but one lives in a village where people practice both reciprocity and guaranteeing everyone's subsistence, he or she is better off. Besides making a difference to such less tangible things as his or her mental health, it increases his or her wealth. For example, money lending in a setting where such mechanisms are strong will likely mean more favorable terms than in a place where people with extra rice or cash try to acquire more by charging interest on any they might lend to impoverished neighbors. Similarly, villagers who practice the belief that everyone is entitled at least to subsistence may leave to poorer residents the opportunities to glean the fields, grow vegetables along the edge of other people's fields, and take odd jobs. There is some evidence of this behavior in Nueva Ecija.²⁴ And it, as much as the explanation we suggested in the previous section, may help to explain the inverse relationship in this survey data between rice production and supplemental income. Those somewhat better off by virtue of having better rice land may be leaving to less fortunate people the part-time and seasonal work. Finally, the kinds of relationship villagers have with local elites are significant. A landlord who leaves his tenants with 60 percent of the harvest is better than one who leaves only 40. So is one who gives no- or low-interest loans compared to those who charge as much as the local banks.

Besides helping to explain complexities of villagers' lives and suggesting that satisfaction along income and/or tenure lines are inadequate, knowing the quality of peasants' relationships with others helps one to understand how people who often live precariously close to minimal subsistence manage to survive. Without that information, we are at a loss to explain, for example, how a large proportion of the people in this IPC sample live on such small amounts of land, rice, and cash.

The content of relationships also better enables the student of peasant societies to see the extent to which villagers perceive differences among themselves and others and whether

those differences are threatening, helpful, or benign. Inasmuch as villagers can have perspectives that differ from the researcher's and can ascribe alternative interpretations, it is of little use for a student to deduce a stratification system that has no meaning for villagers' behavior.²⁵ To illustrate we can refer to our analysis. We found no positive correlation between tenure and income. Indeed small holders tended to be worse off in terms of income than tenants. But we do not know whether this "finding" has any meaning for Nueva Ecija villagers. We cannot necessarily conclude that people with similar incomes, even though their tenure statuses differ, will behave similarly or see themselves as being in the same category. One needs to know from the villagers themselves whether income level has any meaning when they identify types of people or when they form groups. It may well be tenure is more important than income. Because of their concern for their private property small landowners may share greater interest with each other, even though their incomes differ considerably, than they do with tenants with incomes similar to their own.

The other major limitation of these data is the absence of history. Without knowing more about these people's lives over time and the

history of their area, we cannot adequately interpret the data's meaning for the presence or absence of noticeable differences among them. Take for instance housing conditions. This sample includes villagers whose income in 1969-1970 was below our estimation of subsistence but who lived in houses as large and as durable as those of people in the highest income range. Does this mean housing is a poor indication of wealth? Maybe building materials in this part of the country used to be inexpensive. Or does it indicate low income people living today in relatively large and durable houses once knew better times? Perhaps they got these houses when they were farming larger or more productive land. Or maybe they inherited the homes from relatives who previously lived better than they now can.

Alternatively, the income data itself may be a faulty basis on which to differentiate people other than in this one particular time period. Table 2 shows that definitely the distribution of per capita household income based on the survey data is skewed; while 70 percent fall in the poverty-or-less ranges, 6 percent are more than three times above the poverty range. The distribution of income by quintiles in Table 16 illustrates this point in a different way. The first 60 percent of the sample had only 25 percent

Table 16

*DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL
PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD INCOME*

	Pesos	Percent of Total
Lowest 20 percent	32,333.04	4
Second 20 percent	82,524.49	9
Third 20 percent	129,264.91	15
Fourth 20 percent	187,523.13	22
Top 20 percent	440,351.13	51
Top 10 percent	295,250.97	34
Total	867,496.26	

of the total gross income, while the top 10 percent alone had 34 percent. This suggests gross inequities among Nueva Ecija villagers. It is even more alarming if one considers the sample excludes the province's non-farmers, who probably represent some of the poorest (e.g., agricultural workers and migrants) and wealthiest (e.g., landlords). Yet our foregoing analysis failed to identify the stark differences we might expect from these income data. Possibly, as we mentioned earlier, the data are somewhat misleading because they are gross rather than net earnings. Perhaps more important is that we have no sense of whether incomes vary considerably over time for the whole province or for individuals. We do not know if this kind of distribution is very recent, perhaps reflecting the ability of some small percentage of farmers to make good income from new high-yielding rice strains, or whether it goes back several decades. Nor do we know whether the same people at the bottom, middle, or top of the income scale in 1969-1970 were also there 5, 10, or 25 years ago. A significant proportion of those who had high incomes in 1969-1970 may have had low or moderate ones the previous several years, when others, who in 1969-1970 did poorly, did much better. We do not even know if those with irrigated land at the time of the survey had irrigation before, and if so, how long. The survey only asked farmers about irrigation for this particular time.

Without information on the quality of villager's relationships among themselves and others and on conditions over time as such, one cannot confidently say that peasants fall into significantly different strata according to income, land tenure, or combinations of both. One could try, as we have in this paper, to identify differences for a small slice of time. Yet even if the effort found (which, on the whole, our analysis of the Nueva Ecija survey data did not) that sharp differences existed, we could not say much about the implications for the questions found in that literature discussed in the beginning of the paper. On the basis of

data for only one point in time and devoid of the respondents' own interpretations, we cannot reasonably speculate whether certain kinds of peasants will pursue one political action while a second kind follows another.

This paper is not the place to elaborate a possible way to study the extent, political significance of, and reasons for differentiation among villager peasants. We wish to end, however, with one thought about the problem. We suspect surveys in the sense social scientists usually think of them are inadequate for this purpose, especially if they are the principal tool for research. One reason is that survey questionnaires are too brief an encounter between peasant and student. It is not sufficient opportunity for an inquiring person to discover the appropriate questions and idiom in which to phrase them. An anthropological type of approach, perhaps supplemented with some well-designed surveys, seems to us more appropriate. Significantly, it is anthropologists doing village studies in the Philippines and other Third World countries who have come to grips better than other social scientists with the complexities of relationships among villagers. Anthropological studies, however, generally ignore the larger context, historical and otherwise, in which villages sit.²⁶ The approach needs modification.

Getting villagers to discuss their family and personal histories would alter that approach in order to learn about individuals, villages, and the larger economic and political setting over time. By talking with people about their lives and livelihood, a student could trace the evolution of different types of peasants and villages. The inquiry, for instance, could probe the relative importance for a family's present situation of individual members' initiatives and weaknesses, on the one hand, and chance opportunities and crises, on the other. It would be a way to query whether the relatively well-off become more so while the poor get poorer.²⁷ This approach

could also encourage villagers to discuss their perceptions and explanations not only for what they themselves experienced but for

events surrounding them and their relationships with other fellow villagers and less familiar people.

Notes

¹As for defining "peasant," we go along with Eric Wolf's definition. See Wolf (1966).

²For a provocative critique of this idea, see Mortimer (1975).

³It depends on how one interprets Paige's distinction between revolt and revolution and between peasants on commercial estates and peasants on sharecropped estates (1975:79, 121-122). And Paige sometimes makes what appear to be contradictory statements. For example, he writes on page 121 that "revolutionary socialist war is particularly likely in decentralized sharecropping systems. . . ." But on the next page he says "Revolution begins. . . among the proletarianized sharecroppers and migratory laborers of the landed estates."

⁴For more information about how the data were collected, see Pahilanga-de los Reyes (1971); Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (1972:7-78); and Mangahas *et al.* (1976).

⁵For more description of these land tenure types, see Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (1972); Kerkvliet (1974:1-76); and Takahashi (1969).

⁶The tenure of all rice farmers in Nueva Ecija, according to the Nueva Ecija 1971 Census (Philippines, NEDA and NCSO, 1974b:6) are as follows:

Tenure	Number	Percentage
Share tenants	19,130	33.6
Lessee tenants	14,235	25.0
Other tenant types	2,507	4.4
Part-owners	8,608	15.1
Owners	8,015	14.1
Others	4,436	7.8
Total	56,931	100.0

The census has no "lessee-share" category. Such rice farmers are among those in "other tenant types." If the census is accurate, the IPC survey underrepresents

part-owners but overrepresents lessees. Regarding the category "others," the only example the census report gives is "squatter farmers" (p. xv).

⁷The census (Philippines, NEDA and NCSO, 1974a:148) says the province had 17,879 privately employed "farmworkers" who earned a wage. The total number of private or self-employed people in farming (17,879 + 308 + 61,701 + 1,909) was 81,797. And 17,879 is 22 percent of that total. This may be an underestimate because, according to the agriculture census, "persons working for pay" did most of the work on 19,145 of all (60,091) farms (Philippines, NEDA and NCSO, 1974b:41). Probably those farms alone, to say nothing of other farms where wage-earners did some of the work, employed more than 17,879 people.

⁸The statement requires some elaboration. We began with more ambiguity than clarity. Our line of inquiry became more focused after some trial and error. And we also had to recode responses to many of the questions in order to get at least ordinal scales, and we recoded, by clustering, some of the scales after initial computer runs showed this would be justifiable. All our computer analyses used SPSS programs, see Nie *et al.* (1975).

⁹We calculated each villager's per capita income this way:

$$\frac{(A69 \times P69) + (A70 \times P70) + (A70 \times P70) + (A71 \times P71)}{2} (18) + E$$

F

A69, A70, and A71 is area (in hectares) harvested for July-December 1969, January-June 1970, July-December 1970, respectively.

P69, P70, and P71 is productivity (in cavans of palay per hectare) for each of those same seasons. E is total supplementary annual peso earnings from all family members.

F is number of persons in the family.

For part-owners and lessee-share tenants we had to do this area-times-productivity part of the equation two or three times since they had two or three types of farms. We divided the area-times-productivity part of the equation by two to get the annual average. Because coders at IPC grouped the data for area, productivity, farm size, and additional earnings, we used the midpoints of each case. The constant 18 in the equation is the peso price per cavan of *palay* (unhusked rice). This is the best estimate we could devise after considering the following: According to Kerkvliet (1974:52), *palay* in one part of the province of Nueva Ecija sold for about ₱15/cavan during harvest time (the season when most farmers sell, if they sell at all). Yet according to a government subsidy program in 1970-1971, the minimum price for a seller would be ₱16/cavan. Finally, the figure was over ₱20/cavan on the wholesale market in Cabanatuan in 1970 and 1971 during and shortly following peak harvest months, see Mears and Anden (1972:232).

¹⁰The correlation measure we used for both ordinal and interval scaled data is Pearson's *r*. Although generally a measure for interval scales, Pearson's *r* can also be used in this case for ordinal scales because the coefficient is identical to Spearman's *r*. See Helen M. Walker and Lev (1953:280-281).

¹¹The surveyors asked only whether the villager sold rice and, if so, whether he did so after consulting others about where and how to sell it. Unfortunately, they did not get information on how much rice each villager sold. We scaled the answer this way: no rice sold, sold rice without consultation, and sold rice with consultation. Our assumption, based on our familiarity with Nueva Ecija, is that those who consulted friends and other sellers sold more than those who did not consult. The latter probably sold small quantities within the vicinity of their barrios.

¹²The survey collected much more data than this about loaning and borrowing. And initial analyses at the Institute of Philippine Culture used those data, see Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (1972) and Pahilanga-de los Reyes (1971). But the project head, Romana Pahilanga-de los Reyes, wrote to Kerkvliet in June 1972 that these data were improperly coded and hence should be disregarded. We are therefore using only those properly coded questions.

¹³Initially we had more variables. Some we discarded because they revealed little variance (e.g., religion, sex, and views of good life). Others we stopped using because they added nothing to our effort to distinguish among peasants according to tenure and income (e.g., respondents' assessments of extension workers and reasons given for the absence

of barrio organizations).

¹⁴By way of clarification, Scott's notion of "subsistence crisis level" (which we are trying to use here) is different from Abrera's. Abrera's "subsistence level" corresponds to her "total threshold," the category we are using to help define our "poverty" range. When we refer to a "subsistence" range, we connote as Scott does a condition much worse than Abrera's "total threshold" and would be roughly equivalent to her "absolute poverty" or "food threshold" categories. See Scott (1976:17).

¹⁵Alternatively, it might reflect a small but noticeable proportion of tenant farmers becoming, as they get older, owners. The data collected in this survey are insufficient to verify either this interpretation or the one we have stated in the text. Ours, however, does jibe better with what we know about Nueva Ecija's history. In this paper's conclusion, we discuss the problem of interpreting such relationships in the absence of a historical context.

¹⁶Even though family size was part of the equation we used to calculate per capita income, we see three reasons why its relationship to income is informative. First, the interaction of several variables produced the per capita earning figure. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the relationship of just family to the result of that interaction. Second, not all variables in the equation turned out to have similarly strong relationships to per capita income. Income from other sources ("E" in the equation in note 9 above) had virtually no relationship when we correlated it with per capita earnings for all respondents. Third, the relationship between family size and per capita earnings varied within different income ranges, and controls for tenure status (Mangahas *et al.*, 1976: 23-38; Ruttan, 1966:42-63; and Cheung, 1969).

¹⁷Another, but perhaps small, proportion of farmers selling rice could be those who cannot afford to eat their own produce. They sell then use the money to buy cheaper varieties of rice or inexpensive vegetables and tubers. Perhaps reflecting this phenomenon is the rather strong inverse relationship (-.35) between selling rice and per capita income in the "below subsistence" range.

¹⁸Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan's study (1954:164) of nine barrios in Central Luzon twenty years ago found that only 24 percent of the farmers sold rice. Also opposite from this IPC Nueva Ecija survey, Rivera and McMillan found only 11 percent of the owners but 28 percent of tenants sold rice.

¹⁹Correlations reported in this paper involving area or productivity data *and* tenure status include only share tenants, lessee tenants, and owners. We did correlations for lessee-share tenants and part-owners, but reporting these is cumbersome and frequently meaningless (due to insufficient cases). It is cumbersome because, as a result of coding procedures, there is a score for each type of land (share tenanted, leased, and owner) that these "mixed" tenure groups farmed. We can say that, generally, these scores were similar to those for the other three tenure groups. When calculating per capita household income or correlating income ranges with rice production, however, we included area and productivity for all villagers.

²⁰Another possibility is that owners purposely produce less in order to take more remunerative non-agricultural jobs. We know, however, no studies that would support this. And from what we understand about villagers in Central Luzon, we suspect this is not the case. For one thing, the non-agricultural jobs are generally low paying and unattractive.

²¹See, for example, Mamdani (1972); White (1973:217-236); and White (1976:267-290).

²²At least two anthropological works on the Philippines are relevant here: Takahashi (1969), which emphasizes horizontal rather than vertical stratification and the ambiguity of even this view; and Lewis (1971), which emphasizes the difficulties of stratifying peasants due to geographical differences and the variety of relationships people have to land.

²³See, for instance, Foster (1965:293-315) and Jayawardena (1968:413-446).

²⁴See Kerkvliet (1974:37-38).

²⁵For a brilliant illustration of this point, see Scott (1975:489-532).

²⁶For some discussion along this line, see Blok (1974:8-13) and Migdal (1974:22-23).

²⁷See the theoretical argument in Lipton (1968) and Weeks (1970).

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